This paper provides new evidence on the impact of slow judiciaries on economic performance using a unique data set assembled after a major Indian judicial reform implemented in 2002. The existing literature does not provide a clear assessment of the empirical e¤ects of slow judiciaries on economic activity because it is hard to …nd a source of variation in judicial e¢ ciency that would help identify the latter's impact on …rms' behavior. The Indian judicial reform studied in our paper seeks to simplify and shorten the procedural handling of court cases as speci…ed in the Code of Civil Procedure. It is composed of 88 Code amendments, all of which have been carefully examined and classi…ed in this paper. Several amendments had previously been implemented in some States due to the latter's right to locally amend the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, cross-State variation in reform implementation can be used to isolate the impact of the judiciary on economic activity. The cross-State variation in reform implementation is related to the contracting behavior of 520,000 small informal non- Slow judiciaries may signi…cantly in ‡uence the contracting behavior of …rms. First, incentives to cooperate in a contractual agreement might weaken because slower judiciaries make the discounted value of punishment from deviation lower. Second, incentives to invest might decrease if there is a possibility of post-contractual opportunistic behavior by a …rm's partner once the investment costs are sunk (Klein et al, 1978) . Third, States not having passed any, before and after the reform. Djankov et al (2003) have made an important contribution to the study of courts.
They measured judicial formalism in 109 countries around the world. They found judicial formalism greater in countries with civil rather than common law systems and that it is associated with a lack of consistency, honesty and fairness in judicial decisions. Endogeneity concerns were addressed by using legal origin as an instrument for judicial formalism. Acemoglu et al (2005) use the same data to relate judicial e¢ ciency to economic outcomes using legal origin as an instrumental variable. They …nd that contracting institutions have no impact on economic performance once property rights institutions are controlled for. This paper di¤ers from Acemoglu et al (2005) in two ways.
First, it uses a within-country analysis of India. By limiting myself to one country, I am able to control for a range of factors and in ‡uences that cannot be as convincingly controlled for in cross country data. This allows me to identify the e¤ect of judicial e¢ ciency independently from that of laws, legal origins, and other country-wide characteristics. Second, it generates clear policy implications regarding the desirability of reforms to the Code of Civil Procedure.
In the literature attempting to measure the impact of judiciaries on economic performance, none of the papers deal with the potential endogeneity of the judicial ine¢ ciency measures. Much of the literature exploits spatial variation in the quality of a particular institution to identify its e¤ect on economic activity. Knack and Keefer (1995) 3 relate professional country risk measures provided by business experts to judicial quality measures, which is the amount of contract-intensive money (the di¤erence between M2 and cash). However, it may be, for example, that States having generally better policies are also more likely to have e¢ cient judiciaries. If this is the case, judicial quality merely re ‡ects better economic policies and in itself may be insigni…cant in driving better economic outcomes. Jappelli One notable exception is Visaria (2006) where a di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy based on two sources of variation (the monetary threshold for claims to be eligible for these tribunals and the staggered introduction of tribunals across Indian states) is used to show that the establishment of tribunals reduces delinquency in loan repayment by between 3 and 11 percent. This paper di¤ers from Visaria (2006) in two ways. First, I show explicitly the link between the reform and increased judicial speed. Second, I
relate the reform to credit access but also to other outcomes such as the occurrence of contract breaches, investment decisions and production goods ownership.
The main …ndings of this paper can be summarized as follows. One amendment simplifying or shortening the procedural handling of court cases decreased by 676 the number of cases pending per judge in the Lower Courts, which represents 35 percent of a workload. This indicates that the reform was successful in reducing case backlog. An 4 extra amendment decreases the probability of experiencing a breach of contract by 12 percent, increases the probability of investing in plant and machinery assets (as well as tools, other …xed assets, transport and equipment assets) by 13 percent, the probability of obtaining a loan from a formal …nancial institution by 8 percent, the probability of renting tool assets by 17 percent. Experiencing less breaches of contract, investing more, having a better access to …nancial markets and to thicker rental markets may positively a¤ect economic performance. This paper shows that moving a …rm from the State that had already passed the most amendments, and consequently with the weakest e¤ect of the 2002 Amendment Act, to the State that had passed no amendments improved …rm performance by 9.7 percent.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 explores the channels through which judicial quality a¤ects …rms' economic performance. I examine four prominent aspects in the life of a …rm: breaches of contract, investment decisions, access to credit markets and ownership of production goods. Section 2 describes the 2002 Amendment Act and details the paper's identi…cation strategy. Section 3 provides background on the 55th and 57th rounds of India's National Sample Survey on non-agricultural informal enterprises. Section 4 presents the paper's empirical method. Section 5 exposes results pertaining to …rms'behavior. Section 6 discusses the e¤ects on …rm performance. Section 7 concludes.
Related literature
In this section, the theoretical literature on the potential impact of slow judiciaries on …rms' contracting behavior is brie ‡y summarized. Four possible mechanisms are described: breaches of contract, investment decisions, access to credit markets and ownership of production goods. As India's National Sample Surveys contains detailed …rm-level information on these four mechanisms, their empirical relevance will be tested in the empirical section. 5
Breaches of Contract
Many exchanges occur instantly and simultaneously. In this type of exchange, there is little reason for promises and enforcement means. Promises are made in cases of deferred exchanges. The enforceability of promises encourages exchange and cooperation among people. For example, the judiciary is an important deterrent to any fraud that might be more economically attractive in the short run. The probability of harsh punishment in monetary or non-monetary terms heavily dissuades opportunistic agents to default ex-post on previous agreements. Slower judiciaries lower the discounted value of punishment, thereby weakening incentives to cooperate.
This situation can be modelled as an agency game. The …rst player, the principal, decides to put a valuable asset under the control of a second player, the agent. The agent decides whether to cooperate (produce, give back the valuable asset and share the trade surplus) or appropriate (keep the valuable asset). Cooperation is productive whereas appropriation is redistributive. In the absence of any contract enforcement, the agent's best move is to appropriate. Consequently, the principal's best move is to not partake in this game. No activity is undertaken in the absence of enforcement means.
If a contract is signed between the two parties and is enforceable before a court, payo¤s are radically modi…ed. If the agent breaches, the principal receives compensatory damages from the agent. If compensatory damages in case of a breach are such that it is the agent's best move to cooperate, then the principal's best move is to invest. The purpose of enforcement is to enable people to cooperate by converting games with non cooperative solutions into games with cooperative solutions. It is interesting to note that the prospect of a distant …ne due to a slow judiciary reduces incentives to cooperate.
However, the judiciary is not the only means by which to enforce contracts. The fear of damaging one's reputation may induce parties to adhere to contracts (Bernstein, 1992; Greif, 1993 , Klein et al, 1981 . A repeated agency game is used to model this situation.
A grim-trigger strategy played by the principal induces the agent to cooperate. An enduring relationship does not necessarily require an e¤ective legal system. This is true in cases of enduring relationships having in…nite horizons. However, most 6
business relationships are open-ended. Open-ended relationships have no predetermined end. They can persist inde…nitely or end unexpectedly. They dissolve and reform easily as circumstances change. Assume that there is an inde…nite amount of players, who form themselves into pairs to play each round of the previous agency game. At the end of each round, relationships continue into the next round or dissolve due to two reasons: unforeseeable changes or appropriation by the agent. When a relationship dissolves, players must search for another partner. This may be costly.
Agents can follow two strategies. First, they can cooperate until the relationship is dissolved by an unforeseeable event, therefore obtaining low and steady payo¤s. Second, they can appropriate and search for another partner, therefore deriving high but irregular payo¤s. In a competitive equilibrium, both strategies must earn the same payo¤.
Another condition for a competitive equilibrium is that a principal looking for a partner must be willing to invest, knowing that he will be matched with a certain probability with appropriating agents or with cooperating agents, whose relationship has just been dissolved due to unforeseeable changes. Such an equilibrium exists under reasonable assumptions (Cooter et al, 2003) .
The power of principals to exit from agency relationships makes some cooperation
possible even in open-ended games. However, an e¢ cient judiciary may increase the amount of cooperation. The low discounted value of a remote punishment given by slow courts does not act as a deterrent to appropriation. In contrast, by swiftly punishing breachers, an e¢ cient judiciary raises the agent's payo¤ of cooperation. It is interesting to note that as cooperation is productive, economic production rises. This simple model predicts that a more e¢ cient judiciary is associated with fewer breaches of contract and higher economic output.
Investment
The previous section demonstrated that more contracts are breached when judicial quality is poor. But one could also expect judicial quality to a¤ect investments undertaken by …rms. I will now consider the case in which a …rm undertakes an investment in order to supply another with a particular asset. As Klein et al (1978) have emphasized, the possibility of post-contractual opportunistic behavior arises. In order to induce a supplier to invest, a …rm can either write a long-term contract whose terms are favorable to the supplier or guarantee exclusivity rights. However, once investment costs are sunk, there is an immediate incentive for the …rm to renege on its contract and capture the suppliers' rents. Alternatively, if the search costs for …nding new suppliers are high, there is an immediate incentive for the supplier to use its monopoly power to impose higher prices. These frictions may reduce investment incentives; in such cases, as Klein et al (1978) have concluded, vertical integration will supersede market systems. Another way of limiting post-contractual opportunistic behavior is to establish e¢ cient judicial systems which enforce contracts swiftly.
Access to credit markets
We may also believe that judicial systems impact on …rms'debt contracts. "The key function of courts in credit relationships is to force solvent borrowers to repay when they fail to do so spontaneously. By the same token, poor judicial enforcement increases the opportunistic behavior of borrowers:
anticipating that creditors will not be able to recover their loans easily and cheaply via courts, borrowers will be more tempted to default. Creditors respond to this strategic behavior of borrowers by reducing the availability of credit."
A direct implication of this is that faster judiciaries, by imposing higher discounted values of …nes paid by borrowers, foster credit supply. A corollary concerns alternative …nancing means. The model of repeated game agency predicts that individuals will seek long-run relationships in the absence of adequate State protection. Long term relationships require commitment. Traditional forms of commitment include friendship or kinship. Some …rms do in fact obtain loans from relatives or business partners. The advantage of such creditors over formal …nancial institutions is that they better monitor borrowers'actions and reduce the information asymmetry between the two parties. On the other hand, interest rates can be prohibitive. The model predicts that as the courts become more e¢ cient, borrowers will turn away from personal relationships in favor of formal …nancial institutions, which are more likely to o¤er credit.
Rental Markets
Another consequence of judicial ine¢ ciency concerns its impact on allocating ownership rights (Casas-Arce et al, 2005). In the absence of transaction costs, agents will e¢ ciently allocate these rights in a way that maximizes welfare. This may involve certain individuals acquiring ownership over the assets they use, while others will purchase access from a separate owner on an occasional basis. But when the control transfer is costly to enforce, in other words when the judiciary is ine¢ cient, we may see departures from that optimal allocation. Market participants in particular may decide to avoid contractual disputes by relying less on control transfers in favor of choosing market structures that rely on more direct ownership by the …nal user.
Casas-Arce et al (2005) apply this reasoning to the housing market. In contrast, I
will examine the prevalence of those entrepreneurs who rent their means of production 1 .
The intuition here is similar and can be brie ‡y summarized. A user faces the following trade-o¤: when renting, he faces risk in ‡uctuating rental prices; when owning, he avoids risk by holding on to the production good, but faces price risk if he decides to sell it. This leads to a theory of rental market size. The user likely to keep producing the same good in the future will own the production good, while the user likely to modify his activity will want to rent and avoid the good price risk. It is possible to extend this model to study the e¤ects of e¢ ciency in judicial systems. Enforcing a rental agreement, for example, by repossessing production goods in cases where renters threaten to withhold payment, takes time. This gives renters bargaining power, which they may use to reduce future rents. In anticipation of this, investors, that is, owners of the production good to be rented, ration their supply if they can discriminate between users. This may have important welfare consequences for Indian …rms. In the presence of liquidity constraints, a functional rental market may help poor entrepreneurs start businesses. A broad rental market may also facilitate mobility across sectors and across regional labor markets, thus "greasing the wheels"of the economy.
To conclude the theoretical component of this paper, I expect ine¢ cient judiciaries to be associated with more breaches of contract, less investments, more di¢ culty accessing credit markets, and smaller rental markets. These predictions are testable using the dataset I will analyze in the following sections. I will now describe the judicial reform in India that is at the source of judicial speed variation.
The Judicial Reform
This paper aims to relate judicial speed to …rms' behavior. One cannot simply relate the e¢ ciency of the courts to …rms'performance without considering the risk that State heterogeneity might drive the results more than judiciary's e¢ ciency per se. The 2002 Amendment Act will be used as a source of variation in the quality of the judiciary. I will now describe this reform and then explain how spatial variation in its cross-State implementation may be used to identify the e¤ect of judicial speed on economic activity. This analysis cannot however disentangle the reform's e¤ects from other changes having occurred in 2002. I will now describe a particular feature of this reform which implied that there was some spatial variation in its implementation.
The 2002 Amendment Act

Identi…cation strategy 2.2.1 Description
The paper's identi…cation strategy relies on the fact that several of the 89 amendments be detained for no more than three months if the decree requires him to pay a sum of money exceeding 1,000 Rs. (5,000). He shall be detained for no more than six weeks if the decree requires him to pay a sum of money between 500 (2,000) and 1,000 Rs.
(5,000). This change was obviously made to adjust for the depreciation of the Rupee. Amendment Act, whereas Delhi experienced only one amendment, as visible in Figure   3 . I expect the e¤ect of the reform to be stronger in Delhi than in Uttar Pradesh. In Figure 6 , we see that Uttar Pradesh experienced a slight ‡attening of its number of cases pending per judge, whereas Delhi experienced a decrease in the number of cases pending per judge after 2002. This is graphical evidence of di¤erent cross-State implementation of the 2002 Amendment Act due to amendments having been previously enacted in certain States. I will now present statistical tests of the identi…cation strategy.
Tests of the identi…cation strategy
To relate the judicial reform to the speed of the judiciary, I perform regressions of the following sort: . One might argue that it was too soon for …rms in the 57th Round to …le cases and experience the increased judicial speed resulting from the reform. Two comments can be made. First, the theoretical model presented in this paper emphasizes the fact that judiciaries in ‡uence …rms'behavior even when …rms fail to make explicit use of them.
It is based on the perception …rms have of judiciaries. Second, one may argue that …rms were aware that the implementation of the reform was imminent and thus modi…ed their behavior from 2002 onwards. The enactment of the 2002 Amendment Act was highly publicized due to the lawyers'strike described in the previous section.
Several characteristics of the dataset make it appropriate for use in identifying the impact of judicial delays on …rms'behavior. First, a detailed list of problems experienced by the …rm was collected. Each …rm reported whether or not non-recovery of service charges, fees or credit hindered its operation. I interpret this problem as a breach of contract. Second, a detailed questionnaire regarding types of investment undertaken is also available, providing information on whether or not the …rm added plants and machinery, tools, transport equipment or land to its assets. Third, information is provided regarding access to credit markets. Each …rm was asked whether or not capital shortfalls hindered its operation. Additionally, a wealth of information on loan sources is reported.
I know whether loans were granted from formal …nancial institutions (central and Statelevel term lending institutions; central, State or local governments; public sector banks or other institutional agencies), money lenders, business partners, suppliers/contractors, or friends and relatives. Fourth, information is provided on production goods ownership.
I know whether or not a …rm hires or owns its plant and machinery, tools, transport equipment or land. This wealth of information allows me to test each proposition made in the theoretical analysis. I will now describe the empirical method used.
Empirical Procedure
To relate the judicial reform to the behavior of …rms, I perform regressions of the following sort: and that may have in ‡uenced the outcomes under consideration.
The second problem regards serial correlation in the disturbance term (Bertrand et al, 2004 ). This is not a major concern, since I only consider two periods of observation.
A potentially more important problem is the serial correlation for …rms in the same State (Moulton, 1990 ). To deal with this problem, I cluster the standard errors at the State level.
I also include sector dummies (d j ) to control for sector-speci…c e¤ects. I use simple probit regressions when the outcome is a dummy variable. Rather than reporting coe¢ cients, I report the change in the probability for an in…nitesimal change in each independent variable at the mean. Multipliers, de…ned as the inverse of the probability that the observation is included due to the sampling design, are used as weights in the regressions in order to have a representative sample. I now discuss the results relating to the four theoretical predictions found in section 1.
Results
This paper seeks to relate spatial variation in the implementation of the 2002 Amendment Act to …rm outcomes likely to have been in ‡uenced by judicial e¢ ciency (or lack thereof). The theoretical section showed that judiciaries a¤ect the probability of experiencing breaches of contract, investment incentives, access to …nancial markets and decisions on whether to rent or own production goods. I will now test these four predictions using the empirical methodology outlined in Section 3. Table 2 Adalats and police force quality. Table 2 con…rms Proposition 1 stating that more ef…cient judiciaries are associated with less breaches of contract. Table 2 also provides a policy implication in the sense that this procedural reform a¤ects a …rm's probability of experiencing a breach of contract. Table 3 (4) is the net addition to land assets owned during last 365 days (1 if the enterprise made such an investment, 0 otherwise). The coe¢ cient is not signi…cant for land assets. The proposition therefore seems to hold for production goods but not for land assets. Table 2 , and add some variables that account for the development of the …nancial sector, such as the State-wide ratio of aggregate deposits to total credit of public sector banks and the State-wide number of public sector bank o¢ ces per capita. This is to control for any coincidental change in the depth of the State …nancial sector 14 . The rest of the table restricts the sample to …rms having obtained loans in order to test Proposition 2, which states that more …rms will 26 receive loans from formal …nancial institutions and less from friends when judicial quality increases. In Column (2), the dependent variable is the probability of obtaining loans from formal …nancial institutions such as government or banks. I found that with one extra amendment of the 2002 Act increasing judicial speed, the probability of obtaining a loan from a formal …nancial institution (conditional on obtaining a loan) increases by almost 5 percentage points. In Column (3), the dependent variable is the probability of obtaining a loan from a business friend (contractor, moneylender) if the enterprise did in fact obtain a loan. The coe¢ cient is positive, which shows that a better judiciary is associated with more loans from contractors where an e¢ cient judiciary is key to recovering the defaulted loans. However, the e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant. The dependent variable in Column (4) is the probability of obtaining a loan from a relative (or business partner) if the enterprise obtained a loan. The result is not statistically signi…cant. Table 5 looks at the relationship between the reform and the propensity of small informal …rms to rent. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the enterprise is renting some of its production goods 15 . The four categories of production goods (plant and machinery assets, tool assets, transport and equipment assets and land assets) are considered in the four columns. I …nd that the 2002 Amendment Act does not have any impact on the propensity to rent plant and machinery assets. However, one extra amendment increased the propensity to rent tools and other …xed assets by 0.3 percentage point.
This an economically signi…cant result compared to the fact that 1.7 percent of the population rented tools. The e¤ect is not so strong for transport and equipment assets and negative for land assets. But the magnitude of this coe¢ cient is small compared to the fact that 35 percent of the population are renting land assets.
Results indicate that the four theoretical predictions obtained from the model seem to hold in the data. Considering that experiencing less breaches of contract, investing more, having a better access to …nancial markets and to thicker rental markets are positive determinants of …rms'economic performance, I now turn to the e¤ects of this reform on the expansion of small informal …rms.
6 E¤ects on Firm Performance
This paper seeks to determine whether a judicial reform that seems to be correlated with an increased speed of the judiciary a¤ect not only …rm-level behavior but also …rm-level performance. Table 6 add the growth rate of the State net domestic product per capita to control for States' economic development. The coe¢ cient remains statistically positive. This means that the e¤ect is not just due to a coincidental State-speci…c macroeconomic improvement.
It is also interesting to investigate the e¤ect of the reform on the decision to start a
company. An entrepreneur in a State with a speedy judiciary knows that he will su¤er less from breaches of contract, be protected in case of appropriation of his investment rents, have better access to formal …nancial institutions and to thicker rental markets.
An entrepreneur will therefore be more willing to start his own company. The dependent variable in column (4) Notes 1 To be more precise, I will consider in the empirical section of this paper plant and machinery assets, tools and other …xed assets, land assets, transport and equipment assets. 2 Law's Delays: Arrears in Courts, 85th Report, Department-related parliamentary standing committee on Home a¤airs, Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha. http://rajyasabha.nic.in/ book2/reports/home_a¤/85threport%20.htm 3 Krishnamoorty, Dasu, Judicial Delays, Indolink, editorial analysis, 2003 4 A lathi is a 6 to 8 foot long bamboo stick tipped with a metal blunt 5 http://www.hinduonnet.com/ ‡ine/ ‡1914/19141020.htm 6 resistance was even weaker thanks to a Supreme Court decision on December 18, 2002, which alleged that lawyers had no right to strike, pronounce a boycott, or engage in a token strike, since these actions deny the fundamental right of access to justice on the part of the litigant public.
http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/web1/03jan17/edit.htm#4 7 The complete example for Uttar Pradesh is shown in Data Appendix 1.
8 I found only 82 State amendments identical to the 57 amendments related to speed in the 2002 Amendment Act. 9 In the microeconomic analysis, proper weights will be used in the dataset, e¤ectively dealing with this matter. 10 See Data Appendix 2 for details on variables. 11 See Data Appendix 2 for some descriptive statistics and sources of the variables. 12 An objective of the …ve-year experimental scheme begun in 2001 was to prioritize basis sessions and other cases involving undertrials. The scheme envisaged appointing ad hoc judges from among retired sessions or additional sessions judges with explicit productivity incentives: fast track courts are required to dispose of 14 sessions trial cases or 20 to 25 criminal or civil cases per month. 13 The latter were established by the government in 1986 to settle disputes through conciliation and compromise. Their main condition is that the disputing parties must agree on settlement. Lok Adalat decisions are binding and its orders are capable of being executed through the legal process. No appeal lies against Lok Adalat orders. There are no court fees. (1), (2), (3), (4) Robust z statistics in parentheses, clustered at the level of the state. * signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%. The dependent variable is the probability to experience a problem of non-recovery of service charges / fees/ credit. This variable is equal to 1 if the entreprise experienced such a problem, 0 otherwise. The variable 2002 Amendment Act is the net impact of the 2002 Amendment Act once taken into account the fact that some states already enacted some amendments in the past. Therefore, this variable varies by state. State dummies and Year Dummies are included. In column (2), NIC2 dummies are included. This corresponds to the National Industrial Classi…cation, disaggregated to the second level. 42 NIC2 dummies were included. In column (3), NIC3 dummies are included. This corresponds to the National Industrial Classi…cation, disaggregated to the third level. 119 NIC3 dummies were included. In column (4), state-level controls are included: number of fast-track courts functioning per capita, state-wise …nancial assistance released for fasttrack courts per capita, state-wise number of cases disposed o¤ in Lok Adalats per capita, state-wise amount released for development of infrastructural facilities for judiciary in India per capita, number of policemen per one thousand of population, total police expenditure per policemen. Robust z statistics in parentheses, clustered at the level of the state. * signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%.
The dependent variable in column (1) is the probability to experience a problem of shortage of capital (1 if the entreprise experienced such a problem, 0 otherwise). The dependent variable in column (2) is the probability to obtain a loan from a formal …nancial institution (…nancial institutions, government, bank) among the entreprises which obtained a loan (1 if the entreprise obtained a loan from a formal …nancial institution if it obtained a loan, 0 otherwise). The dependent variable in column (3) is the probability to obtain a loan from a business friend (contractor, moneylender) if the entreprise obtained a loan.The dependent variable in column (4) is the probability to obtain a loan from a relative (relative, business partner) if the entreprise obtained a loan. There are only 50,000 observations for columns (2) , (3) and (4) I also added some controls speci…c to states'…nancial development: state-wise ratio of aggregate deposits to total credit of public sector banks and state-wise number of bank o¢ ces of public sector banks per capita. courts functioning per capita, state-wise …nancial assistance released for fast-track courts per capita, state-wise number of cases disposed o¤ in Lok Adalats per capita, state-wise amount released for development of infrastructural facilities for judiciary in India per capita, number of policemen per one thousand of population, total police expenditure per policemen. I also added some controls speci…c to states'…nancial development: state-wise ratio of aggregate deposits to total credit of public sector banks and state-wise number of bank o¢ ces of public sector banks per capita. Robust z statistics in parentheses, clustered at the level of the state. * signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%. The dependent variable in columns (1), (2) and (3) is the status of the entreprise over the last three years. It is equal to 1 if the entreprise is expanding or constant , to 0 if the entreprise is contracting. The dependent variable in column (4) is equal to 1 if the …rm operated for less than 3 years, in other words a new …rm, 0 otherwise. The variable 2002 Amendment Act is the net impact of the 2002 Amendment Act once taken into account the fact that some states already enacted some amendments in the past. Therefore, this variable varies by state. State dummies and Year Dummies are included. NIC3 dummies are always included. This corresponds to the National Industrial Classi…cation, disaggregated to the third level. 119 NIC3 dummies were included. In column (1), no controls are included. In column (2) , the following state-level controls are included: number of fasttrack courts functioning per capita, state-wise …nancial assistance released for fast-track courts per capita, state-wise number of cases disposed o¤ in Lok Adalats per capita, state-wise amount released for development of infrastructural facilities for judiciary in India per capita, number of policemen per one thousand of population, total police expenditure per policemen. In column (3), additional state-level controls are included: state-wise ratio of aggregate deposits to total credit of public sector banks and state-wise number of bank o¢ ces of public sector banks per capita. I also included in column (3) the growth rate of the state net domestic product per capita to control for states'economic development. Data Appendix 2: Table of 
